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The European Community  (EC) has for a long time been a keen
supporter  of the  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT).
And  the EC wants the new  Uruguay  Round to  succeed.  Why?  Very
simply from motives of self interest.
In terms of overall world trade, the EC is the biggest player with  a
20 percent share of the  total  compared  to only  14  percent  for  the
United States.  Ten percent of our  Gross National  Product (GNP) de-
pends on exports compared  to  5 percent for the United  States.  Con-
sequently,  our prosperity  depends  very  heavily  on  an open trading
system.  And the system provided  by the GATT over the last forty
years has to be kept going with periodic negotiations to bring it up to
date.  We  want to see  a successful  negotiation,  because  we  would
suffer more  than most countries  if the new round  were to fail.  And,
given the importance  of agriculture  in world trade today, you cannot
have a successful negotiation  without agriculture  as an essential part
of the overall negotiation.
In addition,  we have a major interest in restoring order and a bet-
ter  balance  to  world  agricultural  markets  because  we  are  the
world's first importer of food products and the second largest  export-
er of farm products.
Our proposal  for the GATT negotiations on agriculture  aims at this
objective  and  is,  we  feel,  realistic,  practical  and  achievable.  It calls
for a two-stage  approach.
In the first stage-or  short-term phase-the major exporters  would
agree  on coordinated,  pragmatic  emergency  measures  aimed  at  in-
troducing  some  confidence  and stability  to  the worst  hit world mar-
kets.  The  instability  of those  markets  weighs  heavily,  especially  on
developing countries.  These emergency measures need only be tem-
porary and they could be negotiated to run for a marketing year at a
time.  And,  in parallel  with these  coordinated  rescue  operations,
members  of the  GATT  would,  together,  take  steps to reduce  the
support given to those products in world surplus.
In  the second stage-or long-term  phase-contracting  parties
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tial,  reductions in support.
We have proposed short-term emergency  action on grain,  sugar
and  dairy markets.  We  can appreciate  the attraction  of an inspired
vision  of the world  as  it should look  in twelve  years time; however,
we  must get through the inconvenient present and we are sure that
the situation-especially  on these three markets-calls  for emergen-
cy action.
For grain,  we propose that major exporters  1) coordinate  to intro-
duce  some discipline  of prices and quantities;  2)  agree to halt the
subsidies  war;  and,  coupled with this action,  3)  introduce  some
guidelines  for grain substitutes (e.g.,  corn gluten feed and related
products).
As  to sugar,  the main exporters  would agree  to reduce  the  quan-
tities put on the world market.  At the same  time, however,  the main
importers  should guarantee  to  at least maintain  their sugar  imports
at existing levels and we would hope they might do better. This is es-
sential for those developing  countries exporting sugar whose outlets,
especially  in North America,  have been devastated.  Imports here in
this country have declined by more than  80 percent over the  last six
years and were in imminent danger  of disappearing  altogether  until
recent decisions by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Finally,  on the world  dairy market,  all  major  exporters,  whether
or  not  they  are members  of the  International  Dairy  Agreement,
would agree to comply with the disciplines of that agreement.
One may  argue  that the situation in some  of these  markets  might
appear,  for the moment, to have improved,  but I think that a natural
tendency for agricultural  producers  to increase  output makes short-
term measures even more essential.
In the second, longer-term  phase, contracting parties of the GATT
would agree  to gradually  carry  out further,  but more  substantial,
reductions  in support that encourages  over-production  and leads  to
disruption  in international  trade.  We have  also proposed that an-
other important  cause of world market disturbance be tackled-that
of the  present  imbalance  in  the  protection  given  various  com-
modities.  Strong protection  for one group of products and little or
none for others  exists in many  countries including the United States
and Japan  as well as the EC. It has helped create  distortions,  not
only in trade, but in production and consumption as well.
The  European  Community  also  proposes  that more  effective
GATT rules should  be  negotiated  regarding  market  access  and ex-
port competition  and that a framework of rules should be created for
the harmonization  of animal and plant health regulations.
Finally,  we have proposed that there  should be special and differ-
ential treatment for developing  countries,  giving them the  possibility
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world markets.  If, for the time being,  the treasuries of industrialized
countries  have  paid their tribute,  it  is the  developing  countries that
have suffered  most.
This brief description of the EC proposal  is long enough to demon-
strate that,  even if we  go  in the  same direction,  we  do not go  as far
as the  United  States.  We agree  with the  United  States and other
trading  partners  that substantial  reductions  are essential.  But  com-
plete  abolition  is  simply not  feasible  and,  furthermore,  it goes  well
beyond  what  we  all  agreed  upon  at the  opening  of the  Uruguay
Round.
Substantial reductions  are difficult  enough and the EC has already
set an example  by taking some radical steps in that direction  without
waiting  for  the outcome  of the  negotiations.  These  are neither
proposals nor intellectual pipe  dreams but tough reality aimed at
farm policy reform.
For example,  in the dairy sector,  measures introduced over the
last four years  have brought  milk production  now 25  percent  lower
than it would have been otherwise-and  this at a time when other
dairy producers  around the world have been increasing their out-
put.  The EC dairy  will have been reduced  by 5 million cows by 1989,
i.e.  half the U.S.  dairy herd.
All the measures decided  so far in the grain sector (price reduc-
tions,  tightening of quality criteria)  caused prices  to drop by  an esti-
mated 25 percent  in real terms the last three yeras. For comparison,
over  the same  period  the target price  of American  wheat,  which
plays  more  or less the same  income-support  role  as the intervention
price,  was reduced by only 12 percent in real terms.
Last February,  the  European  Council  decided  to  adopt  a new
mechanism,  the  maximum guaranteed  quantity.  This was  set at  160
million tons:
*  14 million tons below  the best crop,  1984/85
*  25 million  tons below  the forecasted  annual production  for the
next five years.
The introduction  of this new  mechanism  could lead  over the  next
four years  to an  automatic,  cumulative  reduction  in the cereal price
of 3 percent per year in the case of excess production.
To  this must be  added  a 3  percent increase  in the rate of  co-
responsibility levy paid by producers  (3 percent already).  A set-aside
program,  designed  to complement  the measures  already  described,
has also been introduced.
These are only a few  examples.  Similar steps have been  taken  in
all other major sectors such as sugar, oilseeds, beef and wine.
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verse growth  trends in production.  Despite  difficult  political and so-
cial problems and a farm population still at 11 million (of which more
than  7 million have less than fifty acres, compared  with a U.S.  farm
population of only 2/4 million) the EC has demonstrated  its firm com-
mitment to:
*  restore market balance to agriculture,  particularly in those sec-
tors where we play a decisive international role; and
*  put the  brake  on budgetary  expenditure  and  farm production
and insure that market signals are heard.
We have taken these  steps primarily for our own internal  Commu-
nity reasons-we  would,  after  all, rather spend the money on some-
thing else-but also hope that they will reduce tension with our trad-
ing partners.
In summary, I would like to stress three points.
First, we  feel that  our proposal  is practical  and realistic  and aims
in the same direction as that desired by the United States and other
trading partners-the  reduction of government  support affecting  in-
ternational  trade in agriculture.
Second, our proposal attempts  to find a practical  emergency  solu-
tion to the immediate problems facing the worst hit markets.
Third, that without waiting for the outcome of the Uruguay Round
before embarking on our  own farm policy reforms,  the European
Community has actually  got on with the action and has already
reduced support in a large  number of sectors.  We  have done this
first for our own sound Community reasons and, second,  because
these  measures  should  help reduce  tensions  with  our trading  part-
ners.
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